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TRANSFORMING PUNISHMENT INTO COMPENSATION:
IN THE SHADOW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
TOM BAKER*

I have never had a case that settled and the defendant paid
punitive damages. I don't think it exists. You go to mediation
and you just know that you settle the case for the
compensatories and the punitives get dropped. It's a condition.
It never settles for punitive damages.
- EE, Defense lawyer
Punitive damages, the way you're speaking of them, are those
highly stylized, exemplary damages that we talk about, but
every good trial lawyer knows that punitive damages, you really
build them into your compensatory damages anyway, by
showing just short of intentional misconduct. . . . I think
punitive damages exist in the manner in which you present the
case. It's a punitive case if the conduct is egregious.
-TN, Plaintiffs' lawyer
I. INTRODUCTION

In response to apocalyptic claims about the effect of tort law ' s
punitive damages remedy on the U.S. economy, sociolegal scholars have
attempted in recent years to measure and describe the impact of punitive
damages within the U.S . tort system. This research has been surprisingly
difficult to do. Nevertheless, a picture is emerging from studies of trial
verdicts that sharply contradicts the apocalyptic claims: neither the
frequency nor the median size of punitive damages trial verdicts in tort
cases has increased in dramatic fashion; and, in the two tort areas where
there may have been significant, relative increases in size or
frequency-products liability and medical malpractice-that increase 1s
due to the fact that there were almost no punitive damages awards in

* Connecticut Mutual Professor and Director, Insurance Law Center, University
of Connecticut School of Law. Copyright, January 1997, Tom Baker. Thank you to
Marc Galanter, Herbert Kritzer, Robert Rosen and James Stark for comments on an
earlier draft.
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those areas thirty years ago. 1
In terms of trial verdicts, then, we can begin to say with some
confidence that punitive damages awards are far from a dominant feature
in tort practice. Punitive damages verdicts are relatively rare, and when
they are obtained in a noncommercial tort case, the usual order of
magnitude is in the tens of thousands of dollars, not the millions. 2 But
because most cases end in settlement, studies of trial verdicts provide at
best an imperfect picture of tort practice. 3 Thus, notwithstanding the
relative insignificance of punitive damages verdicts, it is possible that the
"shadow" cast by punitive damages awards in the settlement process is
much larger than would be predicted by simple extrapolation from trial
verdicts.
Measuring that shadow is fraught with difficulty. Unlike trial
verdicts, settlements are not public information. The vast amounts of
settlement data which have been assembled by insurance companies have
not been subject to independent analysis comparable to the work on trial
verdicts. Moreover, the interviews with the lawyers discussed in this
Article suggest that measuring the shadow of punitive damages would be
problematic even with access to insurance company data.
Even in an egregious case, according to the defense lawyers I have
interviewed, settlements do not allocate any of the money paid to punitive
damages. If insurance companies were to attempt to keep track of the
punitive component of such "compensatory" settlements, they would have
to rely on the subjective assessment of the responsible insurance
adjuster. 4 Yet, as the plaintiffs' lawyers report, in practice there is no
clear dividing line between compensatory and punitive damages.
Compensatory damages can punish, just as punitive damages can
compensate. Consequently, the subjective assessments of responsible
adjusters would be made within such a wide range of theoretically
acceptable allocations that, in the aggregate, we could have little
confidence these assessments would accurately capture the pumt1ve
damages shadow. Closed claim file reviews are unlikely to be more

1.
The research is summarized in Michael Rustad's contribution to this special
issue. See Michael L. Rustad, Unraveling Punitive Damages: Current Data and Further
Inquiry, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 15, 23-24.
2.
See id. at 26 tbl.3.
3.
See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the
Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992).
4.
This is the method used by the Texas Department oflnsurance study reported
in the article by Thomas Koenig, The Shadow Effect of Punitive Damages on Settlements,
1998 WIS. L. REv. 169, 187-201; and in Herbert M. Kritzer & Frances Kahn Zemans,
The Shadow of Punitives: An Unsuccessful Effort to Bring It into View, 1998 WIS. L.
REv. 157, 162-63.
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reliable. 5 Certainly it is possible that closed claim file reviewers would
be less subject to bias than an adjuster. But any improvement will be
offset by the closed claim file reviewer's comparatively superficial
understanding of the claim.
Whether the product of adjusters or closed claim file reviews,
quantitative settlement assessments cannot, alone, tell us whether the trial
verdict studies systematically misstate the impact of punitive damages on
the tort system. In the event that the settlement assessments produced a
smaller shadow than would be predicted by extrapolating from trial
verdict studies, there are at least two contradictory explanations: (1)
reporting bias by insurance adjusters (what adjuster wants to admit to her
supervisor, or put anything in the file suggesting, that she paid any
punitive damages tribute?) or (2) adjusters' unwillingness to pay punitive
damages in settlement, with the result that cases involving highly culpable
conduct are more likely to be tried. Similarly, in the event that the
settlement assessment produced a larger shadow than expected from
simple extrapolation, there would also be at least two contradictory
explanations: (1) reporting bias (perhaps resulting from the attention to
punitive damages within the insurance trade and the media) or (2)
adjusters' decisions to settle the cases most likely to result in punitive
damages (and, thus, worth paying some punitive damages "tribute" to
settle). Even if the punitive damages "shadow" turns out to be about the
same size as predicted by the trial verdict studies, that result is as likely
to follow from the canceling out of the contradictory biases and behavior
of different adjusters (or closed claim file reviewers) as it is to reflect real
agreement between settlements and verdicts.
Studies that use aggregate settlement data without undertaking
individualized file reviews would be even more difficult to interpret.
Imagine a study that correlated settlement amounts with the presence or
absence of a punitive damages count in the complaint. Would a result
that settlement amounts are higher in cases with punitive damages counts
really tell us very much about the punitive damages shadow? It is to be
expected that punitive damages claims and higher settlements will be
closely correlated, but that does not mean that the one causes the other.
As the research reported in this Article suggests, the far more plausible
causal connection is between aggravated fault and the settlement amount.
Punitive damage claims and higher settlements are correlated because both
follow from aggravated fault on the part of the defendant. The causal

5.
A closed claim file review is a review of insurance company claims files that
have been closed to determine how the claim was handled . Typically, a closed claim file
review is based only on the information contained in the file and does not include an
interview of the adjuster(s) who handled the file.
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connection between fault and settlement amount cannot be explored
without individualized assessment of the level of fault in the cases
analyzed.
None of this is to say that claims settlements studies-even those
without individualized case assessments-are a waste of effort. Even
though the results inevitably would be subject to conflicting
interpretations, we would benefit from learning how the observed punitive
damages shadow compares to that predicted by trial verdicts. But we
cannot expect that such studies will end the political debate.
This Article highlights an aspect of tort practice that further
complicates any attempt to measure the impact of punitive damages on the
U.S. tort system: liability insurance coverage restrictions.
Using
information collected in interviews of South Florida personal injury
lawyers, this paper describes how insurance law in action transforms
punishment into compensation, reducing the incidence of payments for
punitive damages without necessarily reducing the cost of paying liability
claims. This Article also describes how punitive damages reform
proposals, such as requiring that a percentage of any punitive damages
award be paid to the state treasury, create the same incentives and
opportunities.
The results suggest two central conclusions. First, there is a core
punishment aspect of tort law that reformers will find very difficult to
squeeze out of tort law in action. Second, regardless of the size of the
punitive damages shadow observed in any study, efforts to reduce the
impact of punitive damages will have less effect on the out-of-pocket cost
of the tort system than expected. 6 Instead, what is likely to happen is that
"punishment" will come increasingly in the guise of "compensation."
This is not to say that nothing will be squeezed out of the tort system.
But what will be squeezed out is the historically paradigmatic exemplary
damages case in which morally reprehensible conduct causes a wrong that
is far more serious than would be reflected by even the most generous
assessment of the financial damage to the complaining plaintifC
Part II of the Article describes how the lawyers were selected and
interviewed for this study . Part III reports the results of the interviews.
Part IV addresses the implications of these results for tort and insurance
law.

6.
I use the qualifier "out-of-pocket cost" to emphasize that the costs of the tort
system include more than the money paid to plaintiffs and lawyers. The costs of the tort
system include the uncompensated harm suffered as a result of wrongful acts . For a
discussion of the relationship between punitive damages and uncompensated harm, see
Tom Baker, Reconsidering Insurance for Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS . L. REv . 101.
7.
See Dorsey D . Ellis Jr. , Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive
Damages , 56 S. CAL. L. REV . 1, 14 (1982).
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II. RESEARCH M ETHOD

In the spring and summer of 1996, I conducted in-depth, semistructured interviews of thirty personal injury lawyers practicing in South
Florida. The interviews covered many topics related to personal injury
practice. One significant area of focus was the lawyers ' experience with ,
and approach to, punitive damages claims.
The lawyers were identified in snowball fashion : beginning with
references from University of Miami Law School alumni and radiating
outward. _The goal was to interview a cross section of successful personal
injury lawyers who had been in practice for at least ten years. Twentyone of the lawyers presently practice exclusively on the plaintiffs' side;
six of those practiced on the defense side at the beginning of their legal
careers . Eight lawyers practice exclusively on the defense side . One
other defense lawyer presently does some plaintiffs' work, but he appears
to be moving toward an exclusive insurance defense and coverage
practice . The larger number of plaintiffs' lawyers interviewed reflects the
smaller size of plaintiffs' firms and a greater variation in the style of
plaintiffs' practice.
The thirty lawyers interviewed were selected from a much larger list
of lawyers identified by the alumni or in early interviews. Clearly, this
was not a random sample of personal injury lawyers, but my goal was indepth exploration of case selection and litigation strategy, not
measurement of predefined variables. I am under no illusion that the
respondents' interview answers provide a thoroughly accurate description
of what the lawyers do. I interpret the interview records as reflecting
what lawyers think (or would like to think) they do, which is certainly
worth considering in the attempt to understand the role of punitive
damages in tort law in action.
All but one of the lawyers I spoke to agreed to be interviewed . But
for this one exception, I was able to obtain an interview with a lawyer in
every plaintiffs' firm I contacted. There were two high-volume, lowdollar defense firms that I was unable to contact; the remainder of the
defense lawyers were as available as the plaintiffs' lawyers. The
interviews were tape-recorded and , as is customary, I agreed not to
publish identifying information about any of the lawyers interviewed or,
absent explicit permission, to identify any of the lawyers to each other.
(For this reason, the initials used in this paper to identify the lawyers are
pseudonymous.)
On the plaintiffs ' side, I interviewed two lawyers in small firms who
get most of their business from television advertising; four solo
practitioners (one of whom regularly hires an associate for two years or
so after law school); seven lawyers in two or three lawyer partnerships ;
and seven lawyers in firms ranging up to twelve lawyers in size. Cases
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handled by these lawyers run the entire range of plaintiffs' personal injury
cases: auto accident, slip and fall, other types of premises liability (e.g.,
inadequate security), products liability, medical and related malpractice
(e.g., nursing home cases), aviation liability and Jones Act cases arising
on board ships using Miami's active port. All but one of the plaintiffs'
lawyers interviewed would handle an auto accident or premises liability
case, provided it met their criteria for such cases (which varied from
lawyer to lawyer). Six of the lawyers had active medical malpractice
files; most of the remainder did not handle any medical malpractice. Two
of the lawyers had large mass tort portfolios. All of the lawyers had
handled at least one products liability case, but products liability was a
significant part of the practice of less than half of the lawyers.
About half of the plaintiffs' lawyers could be characterized as elite
members of the plaintiffs' bar. They depend primarily on referrals from
other lawyers, many of whom are also personal injury specialists. This
oversampling was deliberate; early interviews made clear that there is an
active referral hierarchy in South Florida, with the result that many of the
larger, more complex and expensive claims that are more likely to lead
to punitive damages are funneled to a relatively small group of lawyers.
In addition to these lawyers from the "top" of the referral hierarchy, I
interviewed lawyers who are active in the "bottom" of the specialist
referral hierarchy (personal injury specialists with a high volume,
settlement-oriented practice who send many referrals "up") and in the
"middle" of the hierarchy (many referrals from non-specialists in personal
injury, some from other specialists both "up" and "down" on the
hierarchy).
On the defense side, the lawyers were all in firms of a least four
lawyers; four were in firms with more than twenty lawyers. All had been
in practice at least fifteen years, most much longer. None of the lawyers
had an exclusive relationship with any one insurance company, but most
derived the bulk of their own work from only two or three companies.
The larger firms tended to have a broader client base, at least over time,
than the smaller firms, but this did not appear to be true with respect to
individual lawyers within the firms. As with the plaintiffs' lawyers, the
defense lawyers tended to have subspecializations, but, as a group, they
handled the full range of personal injury work, with the exception of
small automobile accident cases (which are quite unlikely to involve
punitive damages claims). With that exception, the defense lawyers
interviewed were partners in the kinds of firms that defend the cases
brought by the plaintiffs' lawyers I interviewed.
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Ill. THE INTERVIEWS

The interviews addressed several areas of personal injury practice
that are relevant to the exploration of the punitive damages shadow: the
nature and fre'quency of the lawyers' experiences with punitive damages
cases; the role of insurance coverage in shaping liability claims involving
allegedly aggravated fault; and the way lawyers handle the tension
between considerations that militate against aggressive pursuit of punitive
damages claims and the strategic benefits of such claims.

A. Experience with Punitive Damages Claims
None of the lawyers interviewed had a steady diet of cases which
included claims for punitive damages. The closest thing to a steady diet
was one plaintiffs' lawyer who had handled a series of nursing horne
maltreatment cases and aggravated drunk driving auto accident cases and
one defense lawyer who reported having defended at least a hundred cases
with punitive damages claims (none of which resulted in a punitive
damages verdict). Many of the plaintiffs' lawyers had a story about a
successful punitive damages case, but it was often the only one.
Moreover, that successful case may not have resulted in a punitive
damages verdict. For these lawyers, success is defined by the dollars
they collect for their clients, not by the amount that appears on any
particular line on the verdict form.
The statement from the plaintiffs' lawyer below is typical:
Punitive damages I have never focused on because punitive
damages are an emotional event that in my opinion has little or
no impact on the legal system. . . . I've been practicing law for
nearly thirty years and all I've done my entire career is trial
work-personal injury, wrongful death-and out of the twentynine years that I've been actually practicing, twenty-seven have
been as a plaintiffs lawyer. I've had one punitive damages
verdict in that entire time. And I bet I've gone to the jury
maybe once, twice or three other times. And I have not had ten
cases in that entire time that have made it to the trial stage with
punitive damages. There's only been another handful in which
we've even pled punitive damages.
-KR
Some defense lawyers disagreed with the plaintiffs' lawyers on the
frequency with which punitive damages were pled, especially before
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Florida's Tort Reform Act of 1986, 8 but they all agreed on the rarity of
punitive damages verdicts in Florida even before the Act:
I've handled some in which they've been claimed, but I don't
think I've ever had a punitive damage award against a client.
You read about them all the time, but there's not that many.
-YT
The lawyers would all agree with the statement from the defense
lawyer with which this Article began:
I have never had a case that settled and the defendant paid
punitive damages. I don't think it exists. You go to mediation
and you just know that you settle the case for the
compensatories and the punitives get dropped . It's a condition.
It never settles for punitive damages.
-EE
Not one of the lawyers interviewed reported ever settling a case for an
amount that included a portion identified as "punitive damages." This
does not mean that punitive damages claims do not have an effect on a
case, simply that settlements do not allocate any amount to punitive
damages. Before addressing that effect, however, I want to emphasize
again what the lawyers emphasized to me: punitive damages issues are
interesting and intellectually challenging, and large punitive damages
verdicts draw great attention, but "those highly stylized, exemplary
damages that we talk about" are not a major feature of personal injury
litigation. 9 In this regard, Florida is far from unique. Indeed, the trial
verdict studies report that Florida has a comparatively high rate of
punitive damages awards, which suggests that punitive damages are even
less significant to personal injury litigation in most other states. 10

8.
FLA. STAT.§§ 768.72,768.73 (1996). According to the lawyers interviewed,
the most significant features of the Act are the requirement that "no claim for punitive
damages shall be permitted unless there is a reasonable showing by evidence in the record
or proffered by the claimant which would provide a reasonable basis for recovery of such
damages," § 768.72, and the provision that thirty-five percent of any punitive damages
verdict is payable to the Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund, see § 768.73(2)(b).
9.
These qualitative results are consistent with the quantitative results of a study
of Florida punitive damages cases conducted by Aetna Insurance Company in 1986. See
Koenig, supra note 4, at 178. This does not mean that "punishment" is not a regular
feature of personal injury practice, but simply that the punishment does not regularly come
in the form of punitive damages .
10.
See Rustad, supra note 1, at 35 tbl.5.
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B. Insurance Coverage and Punitive Damages

When (:lsked to explain why punitive damages were not a more
significant feature of their practice, the lawyers gave two primary
explanations. The first explanation is the Florida "manslaughter"
standard for punitive damages:
Punitive damages are so rare because the standards are so high.

-NR
I can't recall the last time I did a serious punitives case. I think
that, as a practical matter, punitive damages in negligence
actions in the State of Florida do not exist. The Supreme Court
standard is willful and wanton, rising to a level that would
support a finding of manslaughter.
-WE

Understandably, the plaintiffs' lawyers would prefer a different standard,
but in fact the Florida standard is not higher than that in most other
states. 11
The second and more common explanation was insurance coverage.
In Florida, as in about half of the states, punitive damages awards are not
insurable for public policy reasons . 12 As a result:
you can't collect punitive damage bucks unless it's against a real
deep pocket. Hence you don't have a real thrust towards that
by plaintiffs. They need the compensation more than they need

11.
The prevailing Florida standard comes from the case of White Construction
Co. v. Dupont, 455 So. 2d 1026 (1984), which held:
The character of negligence necessary to sustain an award of punitive
damages must be of a "gross and flagrant character, evincing reckless
disregard of human life, or of the safety of persons exposed to its dangerous
effects, or there is that entire want of care which would raise the presumption
of a conscious indifference to consequences, or which shows wantonness or
recklessness, or a grossly careless disregard of the safety and welfare of the
public, or that reckless indifference to the rights of others which is equivalent
to an intentional violation of them."
!d. at 1029 (citation omitted). For a listing of various standards employed by courts, see
Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages
Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1317 n.240 (1993).
12.
See Alan I. Widiss, Liability Insurance Coverage for Punitive Damages?
Discerning Answers to the Conundrum Created by Disputes Involving Conflicting Public
Policies, Pragmatic Considerations and Political Actions, 39 VILL. L. REV. 455 (1994)
(a useful review of judicial and legislative regulation of insurance for punitive damages).
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the ability to say, "You see, I proved you did it on purpose ."
-TN
A punitive damages claim against someone without assets is
worthless. It's a stupid claim. Because you're not going to
collect it. So, what good is that? Unless it' s a major company,
punitive damages just don't do it.
-NN

This public policy against insurance for punitive damages has a more
direct effect in cases in which there is no "real deep pocket." But, a deep
pocket defendant is highly motivated to manage the case so that the
insurance company pays. Thus, provided that the limits of insurance are
high enough for the plaintiffs purpose , insurance coverage considerations
affect even cases against a defendant with assets.
Insurance coverage considerations extend beyond the public policy
restriction against insurance coverage for punitive damages . Indeed,
many of the kinds of claims that can lead to punitive damages are not
covered by standard liability insurance policies, 13 as these defense
lawyers pointed out:
If you're going to have punitive damages, think about this, nine
times out of ten it's not going to be something that's covered by
insurance. Where punitive damages issues come up is under the
vicarious situation. 14 That's gonna be covered .... but you're
not going to get a whole lot of cases where there is something
that's covered by the policy and also a puni situation.
-DI

When are punitives ever going to be an issue where there is
primary liability coverage? For example, if I am being sued
because I sexually molested a child, and punitives are part of
that claim, I suspect there's going to be a coverage issue ....
In most cases it almost rises to the level of intentional tort,
where the carrier is going to be interested in denying the claim
to begin with.

-SD
13.
Standard liability insurance policies exclude coverage for harm that is
expected or intended from the point of view of the insured. See Widiss, supra note 12,
at 462 n.20. For a formal discussion of these and other exclusion insurance law issues
relating to punitive damages issues, see Baker, supra note 6.
14.
The public policy against insurance for punitive damages in Florida and other
states does not extend to punitive damages that are assessed vicariously. See Baker, supra
note 6, at 110.
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Indeed, plaintiffs' lawyers report that asking for punitive damages may
lead an insurance company to deny the entire claim on the basis of the
intentional harm exclusion:
We're running into an insurance company now that is claiming
that where we claim punitives, the conduct is so bad that they
are going to deny coverage.

-PN
Usually intentional acts will blow the coverage. So, they try to
say an exclusion applies because it's an intentional act. So
you've got to be very careful when you're going for willful,
wanton, when you're going for punitive damages, that by
getting your proffer in, 15 you're not blowing your coverage.
-NZ
You can plead your way right the hell out of coverage and do
your client no good .... Where you see it corning and you're
able to get punitive damages and there's a deep pocket, go for
it. Where there's not, don't destroy the viability of your client
who needs those damages for life.

-TN
Several lawyers also mentioned the statutory requirement that thirtyfive percent of any punitive damages verdict be paid to the State of
Florida. 16 By making punitive damages less collectible, the "state
share" creates the same incentive against pleading punitive damages as
insurance coverage restrictions. Indeed, the state share creates this
incentive even in the rare "deep pocket" case in which the plaintiffs
lawyer has decided to ignore insurance coverage considerations.
C. Shaping Claims to Fit the Coverage Available

The lawyers reported three complementary strategies for shaping
claims to fit the coverage available: constructing the claim to maximize
the responsibility of the defendants with the most insurance; presenting
the case to minimize the possibility that the insurance company can or
will deny coverage; and using aggravated fault to produce higher
compensatory damages.

15.

The "proffer" is a requirement of the Florida Tort Reform Act of 1986. See
768.72 (1996).
See id. § 768.73(2)(b).

FLA .. STAT. §

16.
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1. TARGETING THE DEEP POCKET

The first strategy for shaping claims to fit the coverage available is
simply a variation on the familiar theme of targeting the deep pocket.
One defense lawyer described this strategy as follows:
Tremendous lawyers like [name omitted] will shape their case
completely to go after the proper party for the proper coverage.
I had a case with [name omitted] a couple years ago, where my
client had absolutely no liability. My client also had all of the
coverage. And what he did was he developed a theme and a
theory that somehow made my hospital vicariously liable for an
attending physician on staff. . . . What he did, and it was
ingenious, and it resulted in me paying him $4 million . . . .
What he really specialized in that case, or what he really
focused in on, was creating the wedge between the other
lawyers and me.

-SD
The plaintiffs' lawyers were unapologetic about such tactics. Targeting
the deep pocket is their job:
I was taught on my first day of practice there are three things:
liability, damages , collectibility. I need collectibility first. I
need damages second . I'm a good lawyer, I'll prove liability.

-DD
The plaintiffs lawyer is not unassisted in constructing the case to
target the best coverage or the deepest pocket. The uninsured (or
underinsured) defendant helps out. Indeed, a defense lawyer candidly
reported:
I mean, you're almost for sale to the highest bidder, because on
a case like that, the downside is so enormous. I mean we're
talking about a twelve or fifteen million dollar damage claim
here with a guy with no insurance. And from the plaintiffs
standpoint, the plaintiff knows that he's not getting a twelve or
fifteen million dollar judgement against an uninsured doctor.
What good does that do him. I mean, he needs to go with some
theory against the hospital.

-NM

1998:211
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As one plaintiffs' lawyers put it:
Frankly, for the most part, the ones who are uninsured are
always trying to look to the hospital. They're going in the same
direction I am.
-TN
These reports concern medical malpractice, but the same opportunities to
divide and conquer are present in any case in which there is more than
one possible defendant.
2. PURSUING THE COVERED CLAIM

The second strategy for maximizing the available insurance in a case
of aggravated fault is shaping the case to reduce the possibility that the
insurance company can or will deny coverage. The most common
obstacle plaintiffs' lawyers seek to avoid in potential punitive damages
situations is the intentional harm exclusion:
If you allege that he intentionally whacked her over the head,
say with a baseball bat, okay, then the homeowner's policy
doesn't come into effect. If you say that he negligently and
carelessly struck her or did something that he shouldn't have
done, then the homeowners policy comes into effect. So,
you've got to be very careful about what you allege-what your
facts are.
-NN
Case in point. I had a case where a little boy was playing
with his friends, and, actually, they were throwing rocks at each
other. And some man with an antique car was driving by and
the antique car was hit by some rocks. The little kids were
playing. He came running out like a madman and beat up the
kid, roughing him up pretty badly. Broke some bones in his
body and just overwhelmed him, physically.
Now, I could have gone in there and said, this is an assault
and battery case and then have written off all my coverage. Or
I could say this individual failed to use reasonable care handling
a civil disorderly matter, and in failing to use reasonable care
he breached his duty of using common sense in apprehending
the child and, as a result of that breach, there was damage
suffered by the child. And I pled a negligence count, and I
forgot about my intentional tort claim.
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The carrier started to do a dec. action, 17 but basically, the
trial court found, when they moved to dismiss my negligence
claim, that I had properly stated a cause of action and under the
facts that it was a proper claim. And I don't have to travel
under an assault and battery claim if I don't want to. I could
continue traveling under my negligence claim: so they dropped
the dec. action and defended the negligence claim and ended up
settling the case, well within the policy limits-there was an
umbrella with excess of a million-but certainly more than the
man would have been able to pay by himself.
-NZ

Once again, the plaintiffs lawyer is not unassisted in constructing the
case this way:
I'm not dealing with intentional torts and when I have what I
think is an intentional tort, I couch my complaint in negligence
and hopefully I'll get the same efforts from personal counsel for
the defendant, the individual defendant or corporate defendant,
to say we didn't mean it.

-TN
The defendant helps the plaintiff because the defendant wants to preserve
insurance coverage. A personal injury case in which the plaintiff can
credibly claim aggravated fault is a case in which the defendant is highly
likely to be found liable. For that defendant the real question is not
liability, but rather the size of the damages and the availability of
insurance to pay those damages.
The defense lawyers readily acknowledge the alignment of interests
between plaintiffs and defendants with respect to preserving insurance

17.
A "dec. action" is a declaratory judgment action. Unless the coverage
question can be decided on summary judgment in that declaratory judgement action,
Florida courts typically stay the declaratory judgment action until the liability action is
decided.
The result is that, in most cases, there is no opportunity to conclusively determine
coverage in advance of the settlement of the liability action. See generally Gregor J.
Schwinghammer, Jr., Comment, Insurance Litigation in Florida: Declaratory Judgments
and the Duty to Defend, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 945 (1996).
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coverage. One defense lawyer reported:
But then you get into the question of assault and battery
So what does the plaintiffs lawyer do? He doesn't even
bother to sue for assault and battery, if he has· any sense. He
just proceeds on a negligence theory and does not bring the
assault and battery theory, because there's no coverage for the
assault and battery and he runs the risk of the jury filling in the
assault and battery line instead of the negligence line, and how
does he explain that to his client? He got a hundred thousand
dollar judgment. Try and collect it. There's no coverage.
What about the scenario where the suit is just pled in
negligence and it's not pled as an intentional tort? Now the
insurance company hires you and you're there defending the
negligence action. What are you going to do, say it wasn't
negligence but he did do it intentionally?

-LD
As the lawyer for the insured defendant, the defense lawyer cannot turn
on that client and construct the intentional harm case for the insurance
company. 18 As a result, the defense lawyer and the defendant in effect
cooperate with the plaintiffs' "underlitigation" strategy. 19 This lawyer
was describing a situation involving a defendant without assets, but even
a defendant with assets wants to preserve insurance coverage. Indeed, the
defendant with assets at risk may be even more motivated to preserve
coverage than the judgment-proof defendant, because the plaintiffs lawyer
may well run away from a judgment-proof defendant once the insurance
company denies coverage. 20

18.
See Parsons v. Continental Nat'! Am. Group, 550 P.2d 94 (Ariz. 1976). For
a discussion of the difficulties insurance defense lawyers face in cases involving conflicts
between insurance companies and their insureds, see Tom Baker, Liability Insurance
Conflicts and Defense Lawyers: From Triangles to Tetrahedrons, 3 CONN. INS. L.J.
(forthcoming 1998).
19.
For a nuanced discussion of this underlitigation strategy, see EllenS. Pryor,
The Stories We Tell: Intentional Harm and the Quest for Insurance Funding, 75 TEX. L.
REv. 1721 (1997).
20.
Cf. Kent D. Syverud, On the Demand for Liability Insurance, 72 TEX. L.
REv. 1629 (1994). For a detailed analysis of the conflicting interests of the insurance
defense lawyer, see Baker, supra note 18.
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3. TRANSFORMING PUNiSHMENT INTO COMPENSATION

The third and probably most important strategy, in terms of its dollar
effect on the tort system, is litigating cases so that the aggravated fault
produces higher compensatory damages. Here, the lawyers agreed on the
goal, but reported different approaches to achieving that goal.
One approach is to present a punitive damages claim to the jury in
order to emphasize the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct, but then
to request only nominal punitive damages, in the hope that the jury will
increase the compensatory damages . A defense lawyer described this
approach in great detail:
In many instances where we would want to admit liability,
we were precluded from doing so because of the claim for
punitive damages . If we got in a case and we were convinced
that this was horrible-DUI, no defense, DUI and left the
scene-well, we would admit liability under those circumstances
in order to preclude the trier of fact from knowing the facts of
the case. In a perfect world, the damages should be the same
regardless of the conduct that caused them. We don't live in a
perfect world.
And we know when we evaluate cases, we know that one
thing we have to take into account is, "Is this a close case of
liability?" Because, if it is, the jury will compromise the
damages. Or, "Is this an absolutely clear case of liability?" If
it is, the jury will escalate the damages.
So the brighter plaintiffs ' lawyers would use the mechanism
of punitive damages to enhance the compensatory damages, but
then when we would come down to final argument, they would
say, for example, "We're not interested in penalizing this
gentleman in spite of the fact that his conduct was such that he
should be penalized, because we recognize that anyone can
make a mistake, and we don't want to blemish his life forever
with a punitive damages judgment or a punitive damages verdict
that is going to follow him and harass him for the rest of his
life. But, because of the fact that we are willing to compromise
on this punitive damages issue, we don't want you to take that
as a compromise on our part with respect to the compensatory
damages we have asked on the cornpensatories side of the
ledger" -because the plaintiffs lawyer never gets exactly what
he asks for , he never does.
But, in a punitive damages case, he can get it all , because
of the [following] argument: "Because of the fact that we're
willing to compromise on this punitive damages issue , and
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we're not asking for a million dollars in punitive damages,
which would be the appropriate sanction in this case, we're only
asking for punitive damages of fifty-thousand, not a million
dollars," whatever the facts are, "but we 're asking for
compensatory damages of $758,829.16 and not a dime less."
The jury says, "Well, that's pretty reasonable. These guys are
being reasonable ."

-LD
Some plaintiffs' lawyers criticized this approach as too risky:
I know, some people try to keep punitive damages in to raise
the compensatory damages, but, in my mind, it can do the
reverse. You can end up having compensatory damages at a
certain level, and then they go berserk on the punitive and
punitive damages are not collectible. So , to me, it's a waste of
time. Too clever by half.

- NN
Our concern in the overwhelming number of cases, [because]
punitive damages are not recoverable, is "Where are you going
to have the jury dissipate its anger?" Our opinion is that in
most instances a jury has a figure in mind, and when you have
a figure in mind, it can come in the guise of compensatory
damages or in the guise of punitive damages. If they have that
amount to award in punitive damages, most likely it's going to
be reduced from compensatories-so you're going to get less.

-KR
Still other lawyers described a middle ground-dropping the punitive
damages claim before the case goes to the jury:
Put in all the inflammatory stuff you have , then drop your
punitive damages line. Who needs a million dollar verdict with
nine-hundred-thousand in punitives you can't collect? This way
maybe you get your punitives on the compensatory line: fivehundred-thousand that you can collect.

-DD
Regardless of the preferred approach, there was a consensus on two
crucial points among all the lawyers. First, aggravated fault produces
aggravated damages , with or without "those highly stylized, exemplary
damages that we talk about." Second, both plaintiffs' and defense
lawyers would prefer to see those aggravated damages "in the guise of
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compensatory damages" rather than "in the guise of punitive damages."
It would be an exaggeration to say that liability insurance is the only
reason for this preference . For plaintiffs, the state share, the possibility
of remittitur or reversal on appeal, 21 and tax law22 are all important
factors, too, as the following report suggests:
You have a major injury, with major insurance coverage, what
do you need punitive damages for? You really don't. And
besides that, you're going to give, what is it-forty percent, I'm
not sure of the exact percentage-to the State of Florida. To
me, we don't see much punitive damages .. . . Usually if the
coverages are there, punitive damages don't matter. Most
punitive damages awards are knocked down by the courts and
not kept. . . . Also, punitive damages, the client has to pay
taxes on. Whereas compensatory damages, if it's a personal
injury, there's no taxes.
-NN
The important point is that all these factors work together to create an
alignment of interest between defendants and plaintiffs that transforms
punishment into compensation, especially in the settlement context.

D. Punitive Damages and Settlements
As the lawyers reported, there are risks and rewards that accompany
asserting a punitive damages claim in a Florida case. The risks are that
thirty-five percent of any punitive damages award is guaranteed not to be
collectible, because it goes to the state, the remaining sixty-five percent
may not be collectible, either, because of insurance restrictions, remittitur
or reversal, and taxes will be owed on whatever is left. Moreover,
proving the conduct necessary to obtain punitive damages could well
eliminate insurance coverage for the entire claim. The rewards are the
(very occasional) punitive damages judgment that is actually collected
from a deep pocket defendant, and the resulting settlement pressure that
can be placed on any defendant with some assets to lose.
When one considers that these risks can be eliminated-and most of
the benefits obtained-by settlement, it is almost a wonder that any
punitive damages claim goes to trial. The risks are eliminated by

21.
Studies concerning the fate of punitive damages verdicts are summarized in
Koenig, supra note 4, at 202-07.
22.
For a discussion of the federal tax law treatment of punitive damages see
James Serven, The Taxation of Punitive Damages : Horton Lays an Egg?, 72 DENY. U .
L. REV. 215 (1995) .
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settlement because the entire settlement is characterized as compensatory
damages. As a result, the insurance company pays (up to the limits of the
insurance policy) and the state (and the IRS) gets no share. Of course,
if the insurance company is unwilling to settle for an amount that reflects .
the aggravated fault of the defendant, the case goes to trial, 23 but that
presents substantial risks for the insurance company for two reasons.
First, as defense lawyers are quick to report, plaintiffs' lawyers know
how to transform punishment into compensation. Thus, the insurance
company faces a real risk of an elevated compensatory damages verdict.
Second, there is a strong argument, which has not been tested adequately
in litigation, that insurance companies have at least some good faith
obligation to attempt to settle compensatory damages claims to protect
their insureds from a possible punitive damages verdict. 24 As one
plaintiffs' lawyer described:
[I]f there really were a settlement opportunity, if it fails to
settle, and it could have settled by paying, let's say a hundred
thousand dollars, and got a complete release for the insured and
[the insurance company] doesn't do that and the insured gets
sued and gets hit with a hundred thousand compensatory and
another hundred thousand punitive, it seems to me that the
insurance company should pay the consequential damages of the
bad faith, which would include the punitive award as well. The
whole two hundred thousand.

-DN
The defense lawyers readily acknowledge this risk. Indeed, when
asked, most of the defense lawyers made an analogy between a potential
punitive damages verdict and a potential verdict in excess of the

23.
This would not be true in actions against large corporations that control their
own defense. The defense lawyers reported that their large corporate clients increasingly
controlled their own defense, whether because of large self-insured retentions, captive
insurance companies, or by agreement with their insurance carriers.
24 .
See, e.g., Magnum Foods, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 36 F.3d 1491,
1505-06 (lOth Cir. 1994) (disagreeing with Soto v. State Farm Ins. Co., 635 N.E.2d 1222
(N.Y. 1994) and holding that, although the insurer's duty of good faith "does not include
settlement or a contribution to settlement by [the insurer] of the uninsurable punitive
claim," it does require "cooperative efforts by [the insurer] with [the insured] throughout
to handle and settle the entire case"). But see PPG Indus. v. Transamerica Ins . Co ., 56
Cal. Rptr. 2d 889, 891 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that "punitive damages awarded against
an insured in a third party action cannot be passed on to the insurer as consequential
damages for breach of the duty to reasonably settle"). The research reported in this
Article suggests that these courts have drawn an artificially clear distinction between
compensatory and punitive damages.
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defendant's insurance policy limits. The potential for a verdict in excess
of the policy limits is well-recognized as obligating insurance companies
to attempt to settle an appropriate case at the risk of being obligated to
pay the resulting excess verdict. 25 One defense lawyer made the analogy
as follows:
SD: I think it's the same issue. The insurance companies that
I have in those cases recognize that there's a risk that they're
exposing their insureds to.
lnterviewer: By same issue, you mean the same issue as an
excess verdict possibility?
SD: Yes. And I recognize that. I keep that in my mind when
I'm defending the case. You make your recommendation to the
insurance company pre-trial, or however far along you are in
the litigation, you say, in your humble opinion the case has a
settlement value of X and if we go to trial there are verdicts out
there, for A to Z, including punitives and attorneys fees, and
they recognize that that's a risk.
Another defense lawyer stated that he advises insurance companies:
It isn't your exposure, but it sure as hell is the insured's
exposure, and if you can get this thing settled for a reasonable
amount and the insured wants it settled for a reasonable amount.
Again, from a bad faith situation the exposure you might have
for failing to make a reasonable settlement of the compensatory
claim and thereby exposing your client to a punitives exposure
I think would be taken into consideration by a jury.
-YT

Like the risk of a verdict in excess of the policy limits, pumttve
damages are a wedge issue that plaintiffs' lawyers can and do use to
divide defendants from their insurance companies. A plaintiffs' lawyer
described this wedge at length:
If you have a health plan in Ft. Lauderdale that has a
million dollars in insurance coverage and they did something
grossly wrong and as a result of that a pretty little twenty-twoyear-old person who came upon their property and when she

25 .

See Kent Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L.

REV.

1112 (1990).
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leaves the front door of their building she is attacked and raped
by a criminal, it's a strong negligence, compensatory damages
liability case, but borderline punitive damages case. Is that
strong enough for punitive damages in Florida right now under
the White Construction 26 case? Probably not, but by keeping
it in, and this is where you get into the incestuous position that
a defense attorney finds himself or herself inyou have the plaintiffs lawyer who is representing the one
plaintiff against Corporation A. Aetna hires the attorney. The
attorney reports to Aetna's adjuster. The attorney might copy
the president of Corporation A, might stay in communication
with the president, but he owes his allegiance to Aetna. Aetna
is the one that sends hundreds and hundreds of files to his firm
and pays the light bill and the secretary's salary and pays his
salary.
So it becomes really an incestuous relationship,
especially when you add into it the fact that the plaintiff is now
seeking punitive damages.
There's no coverage for punitive damages and you asked
me earlier. "Do you play that card?" Yeah, I definitely do.
I play that card because if I can get a sophisticated corporate
defendant to contact his own private counsel and then have the
private counsel call me on the phone, I just say to the private
counsel I think this is a case that is worth in excess of the policy
limits, or I think this is a case where I am going to get the
policy limits plus punitive damages. Either way your client,
Corporation A, is on the hook for big time dollars. You better
put pressure on Aetna to make a very realistic, bona fide offer
to settle this case, or else the worse thing in the world is going
to happen to your client: We're going to go to trial.
-DZ
Because of the uncertainty as to the insurance company's obligation
to protect the insured from a potential punitive damages verdict, punitive
damages may be an even stronger wedge than a potential excess verdict.
One lawyer reported:
There is an absolute and inherent conflict if punitive damages
are not covered. There's more of a coincidence of interest
when limits are low between the insurance lawyer and the
insured, than on the punitives. Punitives is an absolute wedge.
Low limits is not quite the same wedge. One reason is that

26.

White Constr. Co. v. Dupont, 455 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 1984).
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everyone can see that the low limits may well lead to a bad faith
case, whereas the punitives just leads to the insured paying extra
money out of his pocket.

-PN
It is not just plaintiffs' lawyers who use this wedge.

Settlement-

minded judges do too:
Forget the plaintiffs' lawyers playing the punitive damages card,
the judges will stick in the face of defense attorney the fact that
they better advise their client that I am considering a punitive
damages case that may go forward to the jury and the plaintiffs
might have a very compelling case.
-DZ

As a result, defendants with assets to protect engage personal counsel, and
personal counsel works with plaintiffs counsel to pressure the insurance
company to settle the case.
Does this wedge mean that every punitive damages case settles at a
premium? Clearly not. As one plaintiff's attorney reported:
The philosophy that we follow, and this is something that I
teach in CLE, if you just casually throw punitive damages
claims in the case-assuming that you can get the judge to go
along with it now, but I said this before we had the statute
also-you can be creating more problems for yourself than
helping yourself. The minute that a punitive damages claim
gets involved in a case, it gets a higher level of scrutiny. If it
is a corporate defendant, the corporate in-house people are
going to take a harder look at it. If it is an individual
defendant, the chances are that they will, if the individual
doesn't already have private counsel, that they will get private
counsel. That means . . . you got more difficulties with
discovery, because you're getting a higher level of scrutiny. It
also in today's climate, provokes a higher level of scrutiny from
the judiciary. If the judge gets the idea that you are just
throwing this in for its shock value and that it's not well thought
out, you don't clearly have the evidence to support it and that
sort of thing, you lose credibility in the eyes of the judge. So,
the decision of whether to include a claim for punitive damages
or not is something that has to be taken very, very seriously.
-ET
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Where there is a realistic claim of aggravated fault, however,
insurance coverage problems will not prevent the insurance company from
settling the case at a premium that reflects that aggravated fault. Indeed ,
the defense lawyers stressed this point:
The insurance company , if there are insured claims that are
worth five hundred thousand dollars without the punitive
damages claim, maybe they have to pay six-fifty or seven to
settle the case . They do it. . . . These insurance companies
would rather settle that case . I mean, they 're looking at a
potentially greater compensatory damages award as well. The
plaintiffs' lawyers don't want a hundred thousand dollar
compensatory claim and a million dollar punitives claim. They
want a million dollar compensatory damage claim.
-NM
Most companies will tell you that they don 't cover punitive
damages and that's not going to affect their consideration of the
case. But, it'll get settled somewhere along the line .
-DI
Are claims involving aggravated fault more likely to settle than other
claims? That is the kind of question this form of research is poorly suited
to answer. Nevertheless, it is clear that the answer these lawyers would
give is an unequivocal "Yes."
What are your punitive damages cases? Drunk driving. Drunk
driving cases you are going to try like the dickens to settle, you
don't want to go to the jury with drunk driving .
-DI
It [a punitive damages claim] affects settlement usually because
the request for settlement takes a long slow route. It starts with

the defense attorney . The defense attorneys are always
questioned about whether this is a settlement for their
convenience, so the insurance company fights . . . . It just
reverses the drive for settlement. Rather than starting with the
defense attorney advising the adjuster as to the value of the case
and working its way to the supervisor and finally sixty days
before trial somebody in the regional office of the insurance
company looks at it and then they pass it up the line, punitive
damages just immediately gets faxed up to the home office of
whomever the carrier of the doctor or McDonalds or ParkeDavis or whoever it is and somebody up there in the home
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office or general counsel starts looking at it and deciding that
this is something that's gonna be hell to pay in his office if it
goes bad. So, he starts driving down and insisting from the top
that the case be settled. It changes the pressure.
-NY
I think if you have a viable claim for punitive damages against
someone, and you're making an offer to settle within the policy
limits , that really ups the stakes in terms of the adjuster and the
insurance company disposing of that claim promptly.
-TN
If true , would this mean that punitive damages claims cast a longer
settlement shadow than would be predicted by extrapolation from the trial
verdict studies? Not necessarily. It would mean that aggravated liability
casts a long settlement shadow. But to attribute that shadow to punitive
damages is to suggest that the shadow would go away if punitive damages
went away. If these interviews are any guide, that seems unlikely.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Punishment can be converted to compensation because lawyers and
insurance adjusters believe that juries consider the fault of defendants in
deciding the amount of compensatory damages awarded. Lawyers and
insurance adjusters believe that aggravated fault produces elevated
compensatory damages, particularly in the absence of a substantial
punitive damages award. Without this shared belief, an insurance
company would have little reason to pay any punitive damages "tribute"
in a state like Florida, in which punitive damages are not insurable.
When liability insurance coverage is the most important asset of the
defendant, insurance coverage restrictions give both parties a strong
incentive to convert punishment into compensation. When defendants
have significant other assets, plaintiffs' insurance-based incentives are
decreased, but the defendants' incentives are enhanced.
Other aspects of law also provide plaintiffs with an incentive to
convert punishment to compensation. The interviews explored the
incentives created by Florida's state sharing requirement, 27 federal tax
law, and judicial discretion to reduce or reverse punitive damages awards .
Another important source of similar incentives, which was not explored
in the interviews, is the tort law doctrine relieving employers of

27.

See supra text accompanying note 8.
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respondeat superior liability for some intentional acts of their
employees .28
Like the intentional harm exclusion in the standard
liability insurance policy, this doctrine discourages plaintiffs from alleging
intentional misconduct. This doctrine will be most important precisely in
those situations where the insurance incentives are the weakest: deep
pocket corporate cases.
Tort reforms would further strengthen the incentive to convert
punishment to compensation. Punitive damages caps29 make it very
important for plaintiffs at trial to emphasize compensatory damages.
Indeed, it is not hard to imagine a trial argument, analogous to that
reported by LD above, 30 to the effect that, because punitive damages are
limited, the jury should not compromise at all on the compensatories,
once again, transforming punishment into compensation.
Publicity proposals of the sort advocated by Professor Curcio in this
volume are analogous to the statutory requirement in Florida that the state
receive a share of any punitive damages judgment. 31 Under both reform
regimes, a punitive damages verdict would cost the defendant more than
the plaintiff would collect. The result is a strong incentive to settle and
the transformation of an intended public benefit (publicity) into private
gain (a larger settlement).
Settlements give the parties the greatest control over the conversion
of punishment into compensation. This is not only because a settlement
can be counted upon to allocate all of the settlement to compensatory
damages. It is also because the settlement ordinarily terminates the
insurance company's ability to contest coverage for the claim. 32
The transformation of punishment into compensation means that
insurance companies in effect provide insurance for punitive damages
even in states like Florida, that formally prohibit such insurance. The
alignment of interests between plaintiffs and defendants means that, except
in the unusual case in which the plaintiffs' lawyer decides to ignore
insurance considerations, the only player available to protect the social
interest in making a highly culpable defendant-rather than the insurance

28.
See generally STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS
§ 4. 51 ( 1983). I am indebted to Steven Ecker for emphasizing the practical importance
of this tort law doctrine in deep pocket cases.
29.
See Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Punitive Awards After BMW,
a New Capping System, and the Reported Opinion Bias, 1998 W!s. L. REV. 387 .
30.
See supra pp. 226-27.
31 .
See Andrea A. Curcio, Breaking the Silence: Using a Notification Penalty and
Other Notification Measures in Punitive Damages Cases, 1998 WIS. L. REv. 343 .
32 .
The exception is when the insured has authority to settle without the insurer's
consent. See generally, William T. Barker, Settling Without the Insurer's Consent, in
A.B.A. TORT AND INS. PRACTICE SECTION, LITIGATING THE COVERAGE CLAIM 335
(1992).
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company-pay is the insurance company . Procedures that prevent
insurance companies from obtaining an adjudication of coverage issues in
advance of the resolution of liability claims inhibit their ability to assert
that social interest.

